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Abstract 
Ecosystem services have rapidly moved to the mainstream of environmental policies. 
Certification has for decades been a market-based tool for sustainability. Here, we assess 
whether certification of ecosystem services supports forest management and conservation. We 
look at forest ecosystem services, such as water regulation, carbon sequestration, and 
pollination provision, and evaluate the opportunities and constraints for developing systems to 
certify them. We discuss a series of challenges, and suggest that caution is needed: insufficient 
demand for multiple services, high biophysical service complexity, and elevated monitoring 
costs all indicate that opportunities for large-scale commercial viability of certified forest 
ecosystem services are limited. While some certification already exists for forest carbon 
services, we expect the certification of other services to remain a minor niche that seldom 
justifies major subsidies. 
1. Introduction
Certification has generated considerable interest as a means to achieve improved 
environmental and social outcomes in forests and forest landscapes (Auld et al., 2008). But 
successful certification remains hard. Forest product certification has generated numerous 
debates and a broad critical literature relating to its claims, viability and achievements (Putz et 
al., 2000; Cashore et al., 2003; Rametsteiner and Simula, 2003; Auld et al., 2008; Tikina et al., 
2008; Ebeling and Yasue, 2009; Zagt et al., 2010; Clark and Kozar, 2011; Angelstam et al., 2013; 
Romero et al., 2013; Visseren-Hamakers and Pattberg, 2013). In this article, we consider not 
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forest products but forest ecosystem services (FES). While many of the challenges facing the 
certification of forest products will also apply to FES we shall highlight four challenges that 
cause us specific concern and lead us to conclude that certification of FES will face greater 
obstacles than products. Our approach is to first briefly explain the principles of certification 
and how they apply to forest products and ecosystem services. In section 2 we consider 
“demand side constraints”, and highlight the challenge of finding sufficient buyers. In section 3 
we consider “supply side constraints” and the high costs and technical difficulties of 
certification. In section 4 we consider options for progress. 
1.1. Certification theory 
Certification is a guarantee that a given product or process complies with an agreed set of rules. 
Certification initiatives aim to set and implement standards, and communicate them 
transparently to the external world, in particular the actors in a commercial chain of products 
or services (e.g., Marx and Cuypers, 2010). Certification generally requires a demand for 
certified products or services (“consumer markets” in Fig. 1). This includes certification that 
focuses mostly on the end product (e.g., foods that do not contain trans-fats), intermediate 
cases where there is both a concern for the end product and about its production (e.g., organic 
products), and certification that concerns mostly the production and marketing process (e.g., 
Fair Trade coffee). In the latter case, consumers (individuals, households, firms, or public 
agencies) care particularly about the conditions under which marketed goods have been 
produced. Certification thus becomes a tool helping buyers of a market commodity, whether at 
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the consumer or retail stage, to distinguish different types of products or services according to 
whether or not they have certain underlying, often non-observable, desirable features. For 
instance, certified “biodiversity-friendly” coffee entails the principle that the coffee commodity 
and biodiversity protection are sold jointly to the same consumers, who can choose whether 
they want to buy it (“selling biodiversity in a coffee cup”) (Pagiola and Ruthenberg, 2002). This 
implies either that the core commodity production and trade do little if any harm to the 
bundled side objective or, that it actively improves it (e.g., better worker conditions, producer 
profits). 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
A certification system needs to be accepted at each step along the production and marketing 
chain, e.g., with wholesale, retail and end-user markets willing to care for the certification 
(Chen et al., 2010). It therefore assumes potential buyers who care enough to pay (“Society and 
Values” in Fig. 1). Independent certification assumes that key information about the product or 
service is unavailable: if origin, qualities and impacts are apparent and evident, certification 
would not be needed, as it would not provide anyone involved with additional knowledge. 
Second, it also requires some agents (e.g., a market) to benefit from the differentiating effect of 
certification. At the extreme, if a product chain involved only one consumer and one supplier, 
engaging a third party to certify the product adds unjustified transaction costs to a business 
deal where the buyer could self-verify any aspect of the production system. Finally, from a 
market perspective, certification should lead to a premium price paid by the consumer of the 
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certified product, which could pay for the incremental cost of “good stewardship” by the 
producer, and for the costs of certification. 
Direct market incentives or disincentives are not the only driver of certification. Other 
considerations, such as reputation, relationships and perceptions also matter in various ways 
(Araujo et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Lannelongue and González-Benito, 2012). For example, 
certification is a way to exclude undesirable (e.g., illegal or irresponsible) producers who are 
unable to achieve certification. For producers, certification is about gaining market incentives 
as well as about avoiding disincentives. Understanding where the original demand for 
certification comes from—the seller, the buyer, the verifier, or a combination—helps in 
deciding what kind of certification system suits a particular market context. This is because 
different stakeholders have different preferences and requirements for what certification 
should achieve. These preferences and requirements affect costs and the system’s financial 
viability. 
Certification requires the voluntary participation of providers. This exposes certification to a 
selection bias: those producers who already perform close to the required standard will be the 
most motivated to join, since their immediate opportunity costs are minimal. If there is 
widespread pre-certification compliance with good standards, the certification programme’s 
short term additionality (i.e., the environmental impact over and above status quo) will be 
limited; focus will be more on rewarding good stewardship and the consolidating functions this 
can lead to (Persson and Alpízar, 2012). 
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1.2. Forest certification 
Independent certification, related to sustainable forest management, was first proposed by the 
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) in the beginning of the 1990s. The first 
working example of a certification body was the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), founded in 
1993 by environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), retailers and some private 
foundations. It focused on timber production and trade. Additional certification systems were 
subsequently developed and introduced by the forest industry and governments (Meijaard et 
al., 2011), including certification of non-timber forest products, such as rattan, nuts and 
medicinal plants (Guedes Pinto et al., 2008; Shanley et al., 2008). Two decades later, over 30 
forest certification systems have been developed, with more than 500 million ha of certified 
forest (Meijaard et al., 2011), equalling approximately 15% of global forest cover (FAO, 2010), 
although only 1.5% of tropical and subtropical forests had been certified by 2008 (Bennett, 
2008). Various constraints to forest certification have been identified. Limited market demand 
for certified products is a major impediment (Meijaard et al., 2011). On the supply side, the 
scale of operations and quality of governance are important considerations (Ebeling and Yasué, 
2009), while high upfront costs, insecure tenure, and high concentrations of commercial timber 
can also limit adoption of sustainable forest management practices, especially affecting tropical 
forests (Putz et al., 2000). 
1.3. Forest ecosystem services certification 
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Several organizations have been developing certification systems that explicitly include FES, 
such as pollination, flood buffering or carbon storage (FSC, 2010; WWF, 2011). This includes 
FSC’s Forest Certification for Ecosystem Services (ForCES) project, while other initiatives are 
being developed by forest carbon organizations. For example, Gold Standard and FSC recently 
agreed to jointly leverage their respective approaches to social and environmental safeguards 
for carbon certification (Peters-Stanley et al., 2012). Together with other financial mechanisms 
such as direct payments for environmental services and tax incentives, certification is intended 
to reward forest managers for providing environmental services, as well as possibly other co-
benefits. Given the multiple societal demands on forest ecosystems, certification of FES is 
considered a logical progression from timber certification (FSC, 2012). The two share many 
characteristics, but, as we will explain below, there are crucial differences. 
To inform the process of FES certification, we evaluate here what possible constraints and 
barriers may exist, and to what extent FES certification is a viable means to promote 
sustainable forest management. We specifically consider ecosystem services (ES), as distinct 
from goods and products. In economic terms, services are intangible commodities. In ecological 
terms, services include those biophysical processes that contribute to production, to human 
wellbeing or value. For example, carbon fixation generates wood and insect pollination results 
in fruits. Both human-induced and intrinsic variability in the rate of service delivery will 
inevitably result in variable yields. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) lumped goods 
(termed “provisioning services”) with what we consider “genuine” services, and this alternative 
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classification is currently used by many (Wallace, 2007), but may have confused the ecosystem 
service concept more than it has informed it (Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007; Buyers, 2008). Forest 
goods or products differ substantially from services in the way they are made, owned, shared 
and consumed. In addition, many types of extraction processes for goods (e.g., timber, non-
timber forest products) can have negative environmental impacts (externalities), and there are 
often pronounced trade-offs with service provision, e.g., cutting and removing trees affects 
wildlife (Meijaard et al., 2005). Conversely, forest conservation for services such as carbon 
fixation can reasonably be expected to trigger positive synergies such as watershed protection 
for improved water quality (Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010). Although they are linked, treating 
forest goods and products and forest services as distinct concepts maintains a sound separation 
between processes with different market and externality contexts. 
2. Demand side constraints
2.1. Developing certification markets 
Certification of FES requires sufficient demand to maintain a market. Ecosystem service markets 
already exist and new ones are emerging (Powell et al., 2005; Palmer and Filoso, 2009). The 
majority of PES schemes, however, have so far operated outside the marketplace. Many are 
either government-financed or depend on bilateral deals between few or even single buyers 
and sellers, or their respective associations (Wunder et al., 2008). As reasoned above, deals 
with a limited number of participating independent agents are less likely to require certification 
as internal audits will often be sufficient. Carbon sequestration (fixation and storage) is the only 
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environmental service with significant market development, although the markets remain 
turbulent, as shown by closure of the Chicago Carbon Exchange (Peters-Stanley et al., 2012). 
For FES other than carbon sequestration, substantial market development has occurred only in 
the USA (e.g., Bohlen et al., 2009) and Australia (e.g., Pittock et al., 2012). This suggests that FES 
market opportunities are currently few, even though PES continues to expand. 
While FES markets seem limited at present, their certification faces additional hurdles. 
Environmentally certified products target a service bundled into a product (e.g., the biodiversity 
conservation characteristics of coffee or timber production). In turn, certified ecosystem 
services would be developed based on a combination of at least two jointly delivered services 
(e.g., carbon sequestration and watershed protection) or associated non-environmental co-
benefits (e.g., community capacity building or gender engagement). In practice, however, few 
FES buyers care sufficiently about more than one core service, to seek out these bundled 
services. For instance, in a number of PES schemes (Asquith et al., 2008; Southgate and 
Wunder, 2009) and other PES-like transactions based on environmental funds (Garzón, 2009; 
Goldman-Benner et al., 2012), watershed protection has indeed been combined with 
biodiversity conservation. However, in none of those cases has a market prevailed where 
service consumers have chosen among service suppliers. This is because of the location-specific 
character of watershed protection services which means that targeted providers are a given: 
typically there is little scope for choosing between alternative watershed providers and 
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potential impacts on biodiversity play no role in location choices. There is little scope for 
biodiversity certification to guide such choices.  
Again, carbon sequestration is an exception as its benefits are not spatially restricted: carbon 
can be captured and stored anywhere on the globe. For example, the Verified Carbon Standard 
(VCS) and Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) “gold standards” have 
facilitated the trade in carbon combined with other services and co-benefits.  
2.2. Joint financing for multiple FES 
When multiple services are provided from a single landscape, providers may try to combine 
services at a relevant scale so as to increase financial viability (Wunder and Wertz-
Kanounnikoff, 2009; Wendland et al., 2010; Cooley and Olander, 2011; Deal et al., 2012). Three 
main variants of joint financing for multiple FES are recognised: bundling, layering (also called 
“stacking”), and piggy-backing, but the differences are not always clear cut, and for our present 
purpose we do not need to further distinguish between these conceptual approaches.  
While most markets focus on single services (e.g., carbon sequestration, water regulation), 
examples of integrated service trade do exist (Deal et al., 2012). A recent review indicated 
willingness among carbon buyers to pay a premium for co-benefits though few were doing so 
(Ecosecurities, 2009). Some progress is being made in integrating carbon sequestration and 
biodiversity services, which can be traded via international markets to multiple buyers some of 
whom may be willing to pay (Wunder and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2009; Wendland et al., 2010). 
Wunder and Wertz-Kanounnikoff (2009) noted an example of a municipal Mexican watershed 
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scheme where people could voluntarily pay extra money, on top of their watershed protection 
fees, to also actively protect a rare bird’s habitat. Neither of the two services was quantified, 
however, relying more on faith that the stipulated management would provide the two services 
(Wunder and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2009). Certification within the geographic context of this 
watershed and its service users would make little sense. It would add significant cost to a 
system that could more easily be audited or otherwise assessed by the sellers and buyers 
themselves. 
In another form of service integration, one service is sold as an umbrella service, while other 
services “free-ride” (i.e., an inducement but not paid for in a conditional manner that depends 
on provisions) (Gundimeda et al., 2012). An example is the Indonesian island of Lombok, where 
certification of a water service-based PES program is attempted on the basis of its implications 
for carbon sequestration and biodiversity management, both of which have the potential to be 
traded internationally (Pirard, 2011). The key issues are demand and who can pay. Why would 
Lombok watershed service users pay for certified carbon and biodiversity impacts?  
Service integration often involves systems in which buyers agree to pay the premium price of 
certification based on the knowledge that the system from which these services were derived 
was managed to a reasonable standard, without considering how that management relates to 
quantity and quality of service provision. A certifier can declare that a particular forest was 
“well managed” according to a given set of criteria, and that therefore the services from that 
forest could be sold as certified. One example is the assumption that biodiversity is conserved 
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in forests certified for timber (van Kuijk et al., 2009; Zagt, 2010). This kind of certified service 
integration provides a way for providers to access markets, especially export markets that are 
environmentally or socially sensitive. Similar examples are the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), 
the main independent carbon standard, and Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standards 
(CCB), which certify social and environmental benefits (Peters-Stanley et al., 2012). In 2011, 
independent carbon standards with explicit co-benefits had already indicated their potential by 
capturing nearly a third (29%) of the global forest carbon market (Peters-Stanley et al., 2012).  
3. Supply side constraints 
3.1. Overcoming the costs of certification 
For certification of ecosystem service projects to work, they have to be economically viable. In 
other words, the value of the services obtained from forests needs to be higher than the 
provisioning costs, including the opportunity costs of foregone business-as-usual forest 
management or alternative developments. That is, deforestation and unsustainable forest 
management, for all their negative impacts, also bring benefits, and avoiding these processes 
foregoes these benefits (Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009). Opportunity costs are usually the most 
important costs a provider would incur in securing FES (Venter et al., 2009). The magnitude of 
the associated opportunity costs is a gauge for the local pressure for forest conversion (Pagiola 
and Bosquet, 2009). These costs differ for different people and sections of society. Assessing 
how opportunity costs are distributed also indicates who would gain or lose from FES 
protection strategies. 
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The cost of certification for forest management for timber can be considerable: between US$3 
and US$33/ha over a five-year period (Simula et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2010). The direct costs—
i.e., those associated with the certification process—represent between 8 and 41% of the total 
costs, while the remaining indirect costs arise from the improvements required to comply with 
the certification standards. The ratio between direct and indirect costs shows, however, 
considerable variation (Simula et al., 2004). Certification costs are scale-dependent, with larger 
projects incurring lower costs per unit area (Chen et al., 2010). We found no studies addressing 
the costs of FES certification. 
3.2. Certainty of FES delivery 
Monitoring in FES certification could provide information concerning: effectiveness, 
implementation and quantification. The challenges of monitoring effectiveness – showing a 
certified forest is indeed well managed – have been reviewed in a number of publications 
(Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; van Kuijk et al., 2009; Blackman and Rivera, 2010), indicating 
that systems are rarely in place to assess whether certification achieved a positive impact. 
Implementation monitoring is integral to certification, i.e., forest owners are required to 
monitor their practices and impacts. Often this involves proxies. An example would be that 
rather than measure pollination of crops directly a certifier would consider the distance at 
which a forest provides improved insect pollination (Ricketts, 2004). Such monitoring provides 
buyers of certified FES evidence that these are indeed obtained from forests managed 
according to agreed standards. Quantification through monitoring is required as a measure of 
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the services produced. Certified carbon trading, for example, requires quantification of carbon 
sequestered.  
Quantification of service provision is challenging and costly (Kremen and Ostfeld, 2005; 
Crossman et al., 2013; Reyers et al., 2013). To avoid this challenge it is often assumed that 
maintaining forest cover, and managing forests well, have benefits for the provisioning of forest 
services: carbon, water, biodiversity and others. Field studies indicate that such positive 
relationships do not always hold locally. Paoli et al. (2010), for example, noted that forest 
carbon values are high in tropical peat lands but that biodiversity of peat forests is relatively 
low compared to other forest types. Other examples of complex and non-linear trade-offs 
between biological, social, and other factors were reviewed by Locatelli et al. (2013), who 
indicated that simple assumptions about forest management and delivery of services, goods 
and co-benefits are often unjustified. Unless buyers of certified services agree that they do not 
need to understand how forest management impacts the quality and quantity of different 
services, some form of monitoring (or test of the underlying relationships assumed) will be 
required. 
In fact, FES certification developers may face a dilemma. If at the one extreme, the services and 
co-benefits of a particularly type of forest management were perfectly correlated, then the only 
thing that would need to be certified would be effective forest conservation. An example is the 
relationship between presence of natural forest cover and quality of drinking water, as 
expressed in amount of sediment load (Lele, 2009). But then simple locally-based verification 
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standards would suffice. On the other hand, if there were considerable trade-offs between the 
provision of various services and benefits, the resulting complexity and dependence on local 
context would often make it extremely challenging to monitor direction and size of incremental 
service provision changes from management scenarios to a standard of scientific evidence. 
One goal for any certification program for FES is to develop a monitoring and auditing process 
that addresses all the issues of implementation, effectiveness, and validation, but without 
excessive requirements for time, funds and expertise. Technical monitoring often requires 
external expertise, the use of which reduces the involvement of local stakeholders 
(communities, forest managers) (Fry, 2011; Sommerville et al., 2011). Certification projects 
needs to consider what is practical and what is potentially acceptable, and then weigh the 
benefits of locally-driven monitoring (e.g., enhanced local ownership, greater cultural relevance 
and improved institutional strength at the community level) against the accuracy and 
robustness of information provided by external experts. 
4. Can the constraints be addressed?
We have highlighted four challenges facing developers of FES certification schemes: 1) FES 
markets are limited; 2) FES markets focus primarily on individual rather than bundled services 
and co-benefits; 3) FES are difficult to quantify directly and cannot always be directly derived 
from simpler measures of forest management; and 4) certification costs can be prohibitive. 
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The number of real-world scenarios where all these constraints can be readily overcome 
appears limited. Developers of FES might respond by: 1) simplification of certification criteria; 
or 2) development of new concepts. We discuss these further. 
4.1. Simplification of Criteria 
With high transaction costs reducing adoption of forest certification (Meijaard et al., 2011), one 
alternative is to develop simpler and lower standards. The reasoning for simplifying certification 
criteria is that present systems do not provide a consistent framework for evaluating forest 
operations, promoting improvement and adoption of best practice forestry. In that respect it is 
indicative that the majority of reviewed corrective action requests (CARs) for FSC certification 
typically involve parameters that are easily assessed, such as general management plans, 
administrative design, monitoring systems, and contractor relationships (Rametsteiner and 
Simula, 2003). Even though certifiers have taken a broad approach to gauging the implied 
sustainability of commercial timber production, technical challenges mean that some principal 
concerns are poorly addressed or omitted (Putz, 2004; Sheil et al., 2004), for example, 
sustainable use at the species level is not assured (Schulze et al., 2008). The above issue 
suggests that for FES, simple focused standards might do a better job of regulating certified 
operations than superficially more comprehensive criteria and indicators that imply more than 
can be effectively assessed and receive only perfunctory attention (Schulze et al., 2008). Again 
the exception might be carbon where the relationship between sequestration and forest 
management are relatively well understood (see e.g., Hergoualc'h and Verchot, 2011), although 
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other challenges, such as the social context of sustainability remain. And, even for carbon, 
quantification changes all the time with “best available knowledge”, for example the ability to 
predict, assess and monitor soil carbon remains in its infancy (Luyssaert et al., 2008; Donato et 
al., 2011; Ladd et al., 2012; Murdiyarso et al., 2013) – it is not a mature science where the 
basics are fully established. 
The lesson for FES certification might be to seek simple sets of criteria and indicators, with 
monitoring and auditing systems that can be implemented without incurring high costs or 
regularly requiring expensive outside advice, for example on the basis of monitoring land use 
proxies, as mentioned above. Greater emphasis on planning and evaluation of actions against 
plans appears more important than endless lists of criteria (Sheil et al., 2004; Meijaard and 
Sheil, 2012). Self-monitoring by communities or other forest managers might also be an option 
(Fry 2011), although this might still require some form of third-party audits to ensure standards 
are met. 
4.2. New concepts 
One option to reduce the need to quantify links between forest management practices and 
service provision is to set a minimum threshold for the ecosystem below which the sustainable 
FES can no longer be delivered (Kontogianni et al., 2010). This has been called the “safe 
minimum standard” defined as “…the minimum quantity of ecosystem structure and 
process…required to maintain a well-functioning ecosystem capable of supplying services” 
(Fisher et al., 2008). Others have similarly proposed the concept of “service providing units” 
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(Kremen, 2005) and applied it to estimate, for example, the minimum size of a watershed 
capable of delivering dry season flows and acceptable levels of sediment loads (Quintero et al., 
2009). This idea is analogous to the concept of minimum viable populations in biology, whereby 
a given population size is considered the bare minimum to ensure the persistence of a species 
for a suitably long time frame (Kontogianni et al., 2010). Determining such values is not easy 
and such thresholds may reasonably be expected to vary with context (including market 
changes and socio-cultural values) making them both dynamic and complex to estimate. Unless 
robust guiding principles can be identified such thresholds will be hard to specify objectively 
through certification. 
New thinking about the spatial scale of certification is another potential area for progress as 
larger projects typically incur lower certification costs per unit area (Chen et al., 2010). 
Landscape certification, i.e., the trade in FES at landscapes levels and with multiple sellers, 
rather than individual land owners, has been called for to overcome some of the constraints 
and challenges common to smaller PES and FES certification programs: including evaluating 
opportunity costs and ecosystem service delivery, high transaction costs, difficulties in ensuring 
conditionality and limited inclusivity leading to inequitable distribution of benefits (Ghazoul, 
2010; Ghazoul et al., 2011). While landscape certification thus may make sense from an FES 
supply-side point of view, the demand-side response to this concept remains to be seen: how 
many buyers would potentially be interested in buying services from certified landscapes, and 
why? 
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5. Conclusion
When it works as it should certification assures market participants of underlying desirable 
characteristics of a traded good or service that they care for. Yet, within the limited amount of 
market-based trade in FES, the niche of FES that could potentially become certified appears 
even smaller – though carbon is a possible exception. FES certification faces formidable barriers 
both on the demand and the supply side. The lack of consumer demand for bundled forest 
environmental services is perhaps the main obstacle. Few FES buyers are offering to pay for a 
combined set of services. The Global Environmental Facility is one such example, because they 
have an explicit mandate in carbon sequestration and biodiversity. However, literature reviews 
on ES bundling show that this is rather an exception. Some buyers are interested in social and 
biodiversity-benefits, or at least in doing no harm. However, the spatial extent of these 
operations with explicit ES bundling remains limited, especially when we compare to, for 
example, timber markets or other commodities exported from the tropics (coffee, cocoa, etc.). 
Considering that FES markets and demand for bundled services are limited, FES values are 
complex to assess, and certification (transaction) costs are high, what factors could eventually 
promote ES certification? Geographical distance, economies of scale in monitoring, and FES 
complexity could all contribute to the demand for certification, as opposed to self-monitoring, 
or a process of letting a priori beliefs rule. With the exception of carbon fixation and 
sequestration, most FES are both locally provided and enjoyed. Thus for FES certification to be 
viable, spatial scale is an essential consideration. In systems with single buyers and sellers and 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
20 
 
no broader market involvement or outsider interest, or where competitive choices between 
many FES suppliers are hardly an issue for buyers (e.g. watershed protection), self-monitoring 
rather than third-party certification is more practical and cheaper to implement. To those 
presently developing and testing FES certification criteria and indicators we recommend 
keeping these as simple as possible without sacrificing credibility. We acknowledge that this is 
challenging but low costs, simplicity and credibility all serve to make certification more 
attractive. In all situations, we suggest to analyse the trade potential and market scale of FES, 
either alone or bundled with other FES, to see how the costs of certification could be 
internalized. People involved in pilot studies should carefully monitor project performance, 
inputs (e.g., technical assistance) and outputs, as well as all expenses and opportunity costs 
involved in setting up certification projects to understand the reality and thus feasibility of FES 
certification in an unsubsidized environment, including appropriate impact assessment tools 
and approaches. Certification of FES is not the ultimate goal, rather it is one means to achieve 
socially and environmentally desirable forest management outcomes. Service provision 
strategies should always assess alternatives to certification before deciding to invest. 
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Figure 1. Components of certification (adapted from Sprang, 2001). The red line emphasizes the 
importance of consumer markets and societal values for developing viable certification systems 
for FES. If actors to the right of the red line do not push for certification, its relevance will be 
questionable. “Chain of custody” refers to the value chain that allows consumers to determine 
where products originated. 
